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Abstract
Many applications of machine learning, for exam-
ple in health care, would benefit from methods
that can guarantee privacy of data subjects. Dif-
ferential privacy (DP) has become established as
a standard for protecting learning results. The
standard DP algorithms require a single trusted
party to have access to the entire data, which is a
clear weakness. We consider DP Bayesian learn-
ing in a distributed setting, where each party only
holds a single sample or a few samples of the
data. We propose a learning strategy based on
a secure multi-party sum function for aggregat-
ing summaries from data holders and the Gaus-
sian mechanism for DP. Our method builds on an
asymptotically optimal and practically efficient
DP Bayesian inference with rapidly diminishing
extra cost.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) [10, 12] has recently gained popu-
larity as the theoretically best-founded means of protecting
the privacy of data subjects in machine learning. It provides
rigorous guarantees against breaches of individual privacy
that are robust even against attackers with access to addi-
tional side information. DP learning methods have been
proposed e.g. for maximum likelihood estimation [25], em-
pirical risk minimisation [5] and Bayesian inference [e.g.
8, 14, 17, 18, 20, 26, 30]. There are DP versions of most pop-
ular machine learning methods including linear regression
[17, 29], logistic regression [4], support vector machines
[5], and deep learning [1].
Almost all existing DP machine learning methods assume
that some trusted party has unrestricted access to all data in
order to add the necessary amount of noise needed for the
privacy guarantees. This is a highly restrictive assumption
for many applications and creates huge privacy risks through
a potential single point of failure.
In this paper we introduce a general strategy for DP
Bayesian learning in the distributed setting with minimal
overhead. Our method builds on the asymptotically opti-
mal sufficient statistic perturbation mechanism [14, 17] and
shares its asymptotic optimality. The method is based on
a DP secure multi-party communication (SMC) algorithm,
called Distributed Compute algorithm (DCA), for achieving
DP in the distributed setting. We demonstrate good perfor-
mance of the method on DP Bayesian inference using linear
regression as an example.
2 Our contribution
We propose a general approach for privacy-sensitive learn-
ing in the distributed setting. Our approach combines SMC
with DP Bayesian learning methods, originally introduced
for the trusted aggregator setting, to achieve DP Bayesian
learning in the distributed setting.
To demonstrate our framework in practice, we combine
the Gaussian mechanism for (, δ)-DP with efficient DP
Bayesian inference using sufficient statistics perturbation
(SSP) and an efficient SMC approach for secure distributed
computation of the required sums of sufficient statistics.
We prove that the Gaussian SSP is an efficient (, δ)-DP
Bayesian inference method and that the distributed version
approaches this quickly as the number of parties increases.
We also address the subtle challenge of normalising the data
privately in a distributed manner, required for the proof of
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DP in distributed DP learning.
3 Background
3.1 Differential privacy
Differential privacy (DP) [12] gives strict, mathematically
rigorous guarantees against intrusions on individual privacy.
A randomised algorithm is differentially private (DP) if its
results on adjacent data sets are likely to be similar. Here
adjacency means that the data sets differ by a single element,
i.e., the two data sets have the same number of samples, but
they differ on a single one. In this work we utilise a relaxed
version of DP called (, δ)-DP [10, Definition 2.4].
Definition 3.1. A randomised algorithm A is (, δ)-DP, if
for all S ⊆ Range (A) and all adjacent data sets D,D′,
P (A(D) ∈ S) ≤ exp()P (A(D′) ∈ S) + δ.
The parameters  and δ in Definition 3.1 control the privacy
guarantee:  tunes the amount of privacy (smaller  means
stricter privacy), while δ can be interpreted as the proportion
of probability space where the privacy guarantee may break
down.
There are several established mechanisms for ensuring DP.
We use the Gaussian mechanism [10, Theorem 3.22]. The
theorem says that given a numeric query f with l2-sensitivity
∆2(f), adding noise distributed as N(0, σ2) to each output
component guarantees DP, when
σ2 > 2 ln(1.25/δ)(∆2(f)/)
2. (1)
Here, the l2-sensitivity of a function f is defined as
∆2(f) = sup
D,D′
||D−D′||1=1
||f(D)− f(D′)||2. (2)
3.2 Differentially private Bayesian learning
Bayesian learning provides a natural complement to DP
because it inherently can handle uncertainty, including un-
certainty introduced to ensure DP [27], and it provides a
flexible framework for data modelling.
Three distinct types of mechanisms for DP Bayesian infer-
ence have been proposed:
1. Drawing a small number of samples from the posterior
or an annealed posterior [9, 26];
2. Sufficient statistics perturbation (SSP) of an exponen-
tial family model [14, 17, 20]; and
3. Perturbing the gradients in gradient-based MCMC [26]
or optimisation in variational inference [18].
For models where it applies, the SSP approach is asymptoti-
cally efficient [14, 17], unlike the posterior sampling mech-
anisms. The efficiency proof of [17] can be generalised to
(, δ)-DP and Gaussian SSP as shown in the Supplementary
Material.
The SSP (#2) and gradient perturbation (#3) mechanisms
are of similar form in that the DP mechanism ultimately
computes a perturbed sum
z =
N∑
i=1
zi + η (3)
over quantities zi computed for different samples i =
1, . . . , N , where η denotes the noise injected to ensure the
DP guarantee. For SSP [14, 17, 20], the zi are the sufficient
statistics of a particular sample, whereas for gradient pertur-
bation [18, 26], the zi are the clipped per-sample gradient
contributions. When a single party holds the entire data set,
the sum z in Eq. (3) can be computed easily, but the case of
distribted data makes things more difficult.
4 Secure and private learning
Let us assume there are N data holders (called clients in the
following), who each hold a single data sample. We would
like to use the aggregate data for learning, but the clients
do not want to reveal their data as such to anybody else.
The main problem with the distributed setting is that if each
client uses a trusted aggregator DP technique separately, the
noise η in Eq. (3) is added by each client, increasing the
total noise variance by a factor of N compared to the TA
setting, effectively reducing to naive input perturbation. To
reduce the noise level without compromising on privacy,
the individual data samples need to be combined without
directly revealing them to anyone.
Our solution to this problem uses an SMC approach based
on a form of secret sharing: each client sends their term
of the sum, split to separate messages, to M servers such
that together the messages sum up to the desired value, but
individually they are just random noise. This can be imple-
mented efficiently using a fixed-point representation of real
numbers which allows exact cancelling of the noise in the
addition. Like any secret sharing approach, this algorithm
is secure as long as not all M servers collude. Cryptogra-
phy is only required to secure the communication between
the client and the server. Since this does not need to be
homomorphic as in many other protocols, faster symmetric
cryptography can be used for the bulk of the data. We call
this the Distributed Compute Algorithm (DCA), which we
introduce next in detail.
4.1 Distributed compute algorithm (DCA)
In order to add the correct amount of noise while avoiding
revealing the unperturbed data to any single party, we com-
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Figure 1: 1(a): Schematic diagram of the Distributed Compute algorithm (DCA). Red refers to encrypted values, blue to
unencrypted (but blinded or DP) values. 1(b) Extra scaling factor needed for the noise in the distributed setting with T
colluding clients as compared to the trusted aggregator setting.
bine an encryption scheme with the Gaussian mechanism
for DP as illustrated in Fig. 1(a). Each individual client adds
a small amount of Gaussian noise to his data, resulting in the
aggregated noise to be another Gaussian with large enough
variance. The details of the noise scaling are presented in
the Section 4.1.2.
The scheme relies on several independent aggregators,
called Compute nodes (Algorithm 1). At a general level,
the clients divide their data and some blinding noise into
shares that are each sent to one Compute. After receiving
shares from all clients, each Compute decrypts the values,
sums them and broadcasts the results. The final results can
be obtained by summing up the values from all Computes,
which cancels the blinding noise.
4.1.1 Threat model
We assume there are at most T clients who may collude to
break the privacy, either by revealing the noise they add to
their data samples or by abstaining from adding the noise
in the first place. The rest are honest-but-curious (HbC),
i.e., they will take a peek at other people’s data if given the
chance, but they will follow the protocol.
To break the privacy of individual clients, all Compute nodes
need to collude. We therefore assume that at least one
Compute node follows the protocol. We further assume that
all parties have an interest in the results and hence will not
attempt to pollute the results with invalid values.
4.1.2 Privacy of the mechanism
In order to guarantee that the sum-query results returned by
Algorithm 1 are DP, we need to show that the variance of
Algorithm 1 Distributed Compute Algorithm for distributed
summation with independent Compute nodes
Input: Distributed Gaussian mechanism noise variances
σ2j , j = 1, . . . , d (public);
Number of parties N (public);
Number of Compute nodes M (public)
d-dimensional vectors zi held by clients i ∈
{1, . . . , N}
Output: Differentially private sum
∑N
i=1 (zi + ηi), where
ηi ∼ N (0,diag(σ2j ))
1: Each client i simulates ηi ∼ N (0,diag(σ2j )) and M −
1 vectors ri,k of uniformly random fixed-point data
with ri,M =
∑M−1
l=1 to ensure that
∑M
k=1 ri,k = 0d (a
vector of zeros).
2: Each client i computes the messages mi,1 = zi + ηi +
ri,1, mi,k = ri,k, k = 2, . . .M , and sends them se-
curely to the corresponding Compute k.
3: After receiving messages from all of the clients, Com-
pute k decrypts the values and broadcasts the noisy ag-
gregate sums qk =
∑N
i=1mi,k. A final aggregator will
then add these to obtain
∑M
k=1 qk =
∑N
i=1(zi + ηi).
the aggregated Gaussian noise is large enough.
Theorem 1 (Distributed Gaussian mechanism). If at most T
clients collude or drop out of the protocol, the sum-query re-
sult returned by Algorithm 1 is (, δ)-DP, when the variance
of the added noise σ2j fulfils
σ2j ≥
1
N − T − 1σ
2
j,std,
where N is the number of clients and σ2j,std is the variance
of the noise in the standard (, δ)-DP Gaussian mechanism
given in Eq. (1).
Proof. See Supplement.
In the case of all HbC clients, T = 0. The extra scaling fac-
tor increases the variance of the DP, but this factor quickly
approaches 1 as the number of clients increases, as can be
seen from Figure 1(b).
4.1.3 Fault tolerance
The Compute nodes need to know which clients’ contri-
butions they can safely aggregate. This feature is simple
to implement e.g. with pairwise-communications between
all Compute nodes. In order to avoid having to start from
scratch due to insufficient noise for DP, the same strategy
used to protect against colluding clients can be utilized:
when T > 0, at most T clients in total can drop or collude
and the scheme will still remain private.
4.1.4 Computational scalability
Most of the operations needed in Algorithm 1 are extremely
fast: encryption and decryption can use fast symmetric algo-
rithms such as AES (using slower public key cryptography
just for the key of the symmetric system) and the rest is just
integer additions for the fixed point arithmetic. The likely
first bottlenecks in the implementation would be caused by
synchronisation when gathering the messages as well as the
generation of cryptographically secure random vectors ri,k.
4.2 Differentially private Bayesian learning on
distributed data
In order to perform DP Bayesian learning securely in the
distributed setting, we use DCA (Algorithm 1) to compute
the required data summaries that correspond to Eq. (3). In
this Section we consider how to combine this scheme with
concrete DP learning methods introduced for the trusted
aggregator setting, so as to provide a wide range of possi-
bilities for performing DP Bayesian learning securely with
distributed data.
The aggregation algorithm is most straightforward to apply
to the SSP method [14, 17] for exact and approximate poste-
rior inference on exponential family models. [14] and [17]
use Laplacian noise to guarantee -DP, which is a stricter
form of privacy than the (, δ)-DP used in DCA [10]. We
consider here only (, δ)-DP version of the methods, and
discuss the possible Laplace noise mechanism further in
Section 8. The model training in this case is done in a
single iteration, so a single application of Algorithm 1 is
enough for learning. We consider a more detailed example
in Section 4.2.1.
We can apply DCA also to DP variational inference [18, 20].
These methods rely on possibly clipped gradients or ex-
pected sufficient statistics calculated from the data. Typi-
cally, each training iteration would use only a mini-batch
instead of the full data. To use variational inference in the
distributed setting, an arbitrary party keeps track of the cur-
rent (public) model parameters and the privacy budget, and
asks for updates from the clients.
At each iteration, the model trainer selects a random mini-
batch of fixed public size from the available clients and
sends them the current model parameters. The selected
clients then calculate the clipped gradients or expected suf-
ficient statistics using their data, add noise to the values
scaled reflecting the batch size, and pass them on using
DCA. The model trainer receives the decrypted DP sums
from the output and updates the model parameters.
4.2.1 Distributed Bayesian Linear Regression with
Data Projection
As an empirical example, we consider Bayesian linear re-
gression (BLR) with data projection in the distributed set-
ting. The standard BLR model depends on the data only
through sufficient statistics and the approach discussed in
Section 4.2 can be used in a straightforward manner to fit
the model by running a single round of DCA.
The more efficient BLR with projection (Algorithm 2) [17]
reduces the data range, and hence sensitivity, by non-linearly
projecting all data points inside stricter bounds, which trans-
lates into less added noise. We can select the bounds to
optimize bias vs. DP noise variance. In the distributed set-
ting, we need to run an additional round of DCA and use
some privacy budget to estimate data standard deviations
(stds). However, as shown by the test results (Figure 2),
this can still achieve significantly better utility with a given
privacy level.
The assumed bounds in Step 1 of Algorithm 2 would typi-
cally be available from general knowledge of the data. The
projection in Step 1 ensures the privacy of the scheme even
if the bounds are invalid for some samples. We determine
the optimal projection thresholds pj in Step 3 using the same
general approach as [17]: we create an auxiliary data set of
equal size as the original with data generated as
xi ∼ N(0, Id) (4)
β ∼ N(0, λ0I) (5)
yi|xi ∼ N(xTi β, λ). (6)
We then perform grid search on the auxiliary data with vary-
ing thresholds to find the optimal prediction performance.
The source code for our implementation is available through
GitHub1 and a more detailed description can be found in
the Supplement.
1Upcoming
Algorithm 2 Distributed linear regression with projection
Input: Number of clients N (public),
data and target values (xij , yi), j = 1, . . . , d held by
clients i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
assumed data and target bounds (−cj , cj), j =
1, . . . , d+ 1 (public),
privacy budget (, δ) (public),
Output: DP BLR model sufficient statistics of projected
data
∑N
i=1 xˆixˆ
T
i +η
(1),
∑N
i=1 xˆ
T
i yˆi +η
(2), calculated
using projection to estimated optimal bounds
1: Each client projects his data to the assumed bounds
(−cj , cj) ∀j.
2: Calculate marginal std estimates σ(1), . . . , σ(d+1) by
running Algorithm 1 using the assumed bounds for
sensitivity and a chosen share of the privacy budget.
3: Estimate optimal projection thresholds pj , j =
1, . . . , d+ 1 as fractions of std on auxiliary data. Each
client then projects his data to the estimated optimal
bounds (−pjσ(j), pjσ(j)), j = 1, . . . , d+ 1.
4: Aggregate the unique terms in the DP sufficient statis-
tics by running Algorithm 1 using the estimated optimal
bounds for sensitivity and the remaining privacy budget,
and combine the DP result vectors into the symmetric
d× d matrix and d-dimensional vector of DP sufficient
statistics.
5 Experimental Setup
We demonstrate the secure DP Bayesian learning scheme
in practice by testing the performance of the BLR with data
projection, the implementation of which was discussed in
Section 4.2.1, along with the DCA (Algorithm 1) in the all
HbC clients distributed setting (T = 0).
With the DCA our primary interest is scalability. In the
case of BLR implementation, we are mostly interested in
comparing the distributed algorithm to the trusted aggre-
gator version as well as comparing the performance of the
straightforward BLR to the variant using data projection,
since it is not clear a priori if the extra cost in privacy neces-
sitated by the projection in the distributed setting is offset
by the reduced noise level.
We use simulated data for the DCA scalability testing, and
real data for the BLR tests. As real data, we use the Wine
Quality [6] (split into white and red wines) and Abalone
data sets from the UCI repository[19], as well as the Ge-
nomics of Drug Sensitivity in Cancer (GDSC) project data 2.
The measured task in the GDSC data is to predict drug sen-
sitivity of cancer cell lines from gene expression data (see
Supplement for a more detailed description). The datasets
are assumed to be zero-centred. This assumption is not
crucial but is done here for simplicity; non-zero data means
can be estimated like the marginal stds at the cost of some
2http://www.cancerrxgene.org/, release 6.1, March 2017
N=102 N=103 N=104 N=105
d=10 1.72 1.89 2.99 8.58
d=102 2.03 2.86 12.36 65.64
d=103 3.43 10.56 101.2 610.55
d=104 15.30 84.95 994.96 1592.29
Table 1: DCA experiment average runtimes in seconds with
5 repeats, using M=10 Compute nodes, N clients and vector
length d.
added noise (see Section 4.2.1).
For estimating the marginal std, we also need to assume
bounds for the data. For unbounded data, we can enforce
arbitrary bounds simply by projecting all data inside the
chosen bounds, although very poor choice of bounds will
lead to poor performance. With real distributed data, the
assumed bounds could differ from the actual data range. In
the UCI tests we simulate this effect by scaling each data
dimension to have a range of length 10, and then assuming
bounds of [−7.5, 7.5], i.e., the assumed bounds clearly over-
estimate the length of the true range, thus adding more noise
to the results. The actual scaling chosen here is arbitrary.
With the GDSC data, the true range is known due to the
nature of the data (see Supplement).
The optimal projection thresholds are searched for using 10
repeats on a grid with 20 points between 0.1 and 2.1 times
the std of the auxiliary data set. In the search we use one
common threshold for all data dimensions and a separate
one for the target.
For accuracy measure, we use prediction accuracy on a sep-
arate test data set. The size of the test set for UCI in Figure
2 is 500 for red wine, 1000 for white wine, and 1000 for
abalone data. The test set size for GDSC in Figure 3 is 100.
For UCI, we compare the median performance measured
on mean absolute error over 25 cross-validation (CV) runs,
while for GDSC we measure mean prediction accuracy to
sensitive vs insensitive with Spearman’s rank correlation on
30 CV runs. In both cases, we use input perturbation [12]
and the trusted aggregator setting as baselines.
6 Results
Table 1 shows runtimes of a distributed Spark implementa-
tion of the DCA algorithm. The timing excludes encryption,
but running AES for the data of the largest example would
take less than 20 s on a single thread on a modern CPU. The
runtime modestly increases as N or d is increased. This
suggests that the prototype is reasonably scalable. Spark
overhead sets a lower bound runtime of approximately 1 s
for small problems. For large N and d, sequential commu-
nication at the 10 Compute threads is the main bottleneck.
Larger N could be handled by introducing more Compute
nodes and clients only communicating with a subset of them.
Comparing the results on predictive error with and without
projection (Fig. 2 and Fig. 3), it is clear that despite incur-
ring extra privacy cost for having to estimate the marginal
standard deviations, using the projection can improve the
results markedly with a given privacy budget.
The results also demonstrate that compared to the trusted ag-
gregator setting, the extra noise added due to the distributed
setting with HbC clients is insignificant in practice as the
results of the distributed and trusted aggregator algorithms
are effectively indistinguishable.
7 Related Work
The idea of distributed private computation through addition
of noise generated in a distributed manner was first proposed
by Dwork et al. [11]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no prior work on secure DP Bayesian statistical
inference in the distributed setting.
In machine learning, [21] presented the first method for ag-
gregating classifiers in a DP manner, but their approach is
sensitive to the number of parties and sizes of the data sets
held by each party and cannot be applied in a completely
distributed setting. [22] improved upon this by an algorithm
for distributed DP stochastic gradient descent that works
for any number of parties. The privacy of the algorithm is
based on perturbation of gradients which cannot be directly
applied to the efficient SSP mechanism. The idea of ag-
gregating classifiers was further refined in [16] through a
method that uses an auxiliary public data set to improve the
performance.
The first practical method for implementing DP queries in a
distributed manner was the distributed Laplace mechanism
presented in [23]. The distributed Laplace mechanism could
be used instead of the Gaussian mechanism if pure -DP
is required, but the method, like those in [21, 22], needs
homomorphic encryption which can be computationally
more demanding for high-dimensional data.
There is a wealth of literature on secure distributed compu-
tation of DP sum queries as reviewed in [15]. The methods
of [24, 2, 3, 15] also include different forms of noise scaling
to provide collusion resistance and/or fault tolerance, where
the latter requires a separate recovery round after data holder
failures which is not needed by DCA. [13] discusses low
level details of an efficient implementation of the distributed
Laplace mechanism.
Finally, [28] presents several proofs related to the SMC set-
ting and introduce a protocol for generating approximately
Gaussian noise in a distributed manner. Compared to their
protocol, our method of noise addition is considerably sim-
pler and faster, and produces exactly instead of approxi-
mately Gaussian noise with negligible increase in noise
level.
8 Discussion
We have presented a general framework for performing DP
Bayesian learning securely in a distributed setting. Our
method combines a practical SMC method for calculating
secure sum queries with efficient Bayesian DP learning
techniques adapted to the distributed setting.
DP methods are based on adding sufficient noise to effec-
tively mask the contribution of any single sample. The extra
loss in accuracy due to DP tends to diminish as the number
of samples increases and efficient DP estimation methods
converge to their non-private counterparts as the number
of samples increases [14, 17]. A distributed DP learning
method can significantly help in increasing the number of
samples because data held by several parties can be com-
bined thus helping make DP learning significantly more
effective.
Considering the DP and the SMC components separately,
although both are necessary for efficient learning, it is clear
that the choice of method to use for each sub-problem can
be made largely independently. Assessing these separately,
we can therefore easily change the privacy mechanism from
the Gaussian used in Algorithm 1 to the Laplace mechanism,
e.g. by utilising one of the distributed Laplace noise addition
methods presented in [15] to obtain a pure -DP method.
If need be, the secure sum algorithm in our method can
also be easily replaced with one that better suits the security
requirements at hand.
While the noise introduced for DP will not improve the per-
formance of an otherwise good learning algorithm, a DP
solution to a learning problem can yield better results if the
DP guarantees allow access to more data than is available
without privacy. Our distributed method can further help
make this more efficient by securely and privately combin-
ing data from multiple parties.
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This supplement contains proofs and extra discussion omit-
ted from the main text.
9 Privacy and fault tolerance
Theorem 2 (Distributed Gaussian mechanism). If at most
T clients collude or drop out of the protocol, the sum-query
result returned by Algorithm 1 is differentially private, when
the variance of the added noise σ2j fulfils
σ2j ≥
1
N − T − 1σ
2
j,std,
where N is the number of clients and σ2j,std is the variance
of the noise in the standard Gaussian mechanism given in
Eq. (1).
Proof. Using the property that a sum of independent Gaus-
sian variables is another Gaussian with variance equal to
the sum of the component variances, we can divide the total
noise equally among the N clients.
However, in the distributed setting even with all honest-
but-curious clients, there is an extra scaling factor needed
compared to the standard DP. Since each client knows the
noise values she adds to the data, she can also remove them
from the aggregate values. In other words, privacy then has
to be guaranteed by the noise the remaining N − 1 clients
add to the data. If we further assume the possibility of T
colluding clients, then the noise from N − T − 1 clients
must be sufficient to guarantee the privacy.
The added noise can therefore be calculated from the in-
equality
N−T−1∑
i=1
σ2j ≥σ2j,std (7)
⇔ σ2j ≥
1
N − T − 1σ
2
j,std. (8)
10 Bayesian linear regression
In the following, we denote the ith observation in d-
dimensional data by xi, the scalar target values by yi, and
the whole d + 1−dimensional dataset by Di = (xi, yi).
We assume all column-wise expectations to be zeroes for
simplicity. For n observations, we denote the sufficient
statistics by nx¯x =
∑n
i=1 xix
T
i and nx¯y =
∑n
i=1 xiyi.
For the regression, we assume that
yi|xi ∼N(xTi β, λI), i = 1, . . . , n (9)
β ∼N(0, λ0I), (10)
where we want to learn the posterior over β, and λ, λ0 are
hyperparameters (set to 1 in the tests). The posterior can be
solved analytically to give
β|y,x ∼ N(µˆ, Λˆ), (11)
Λˆ = λ0I + λnx¯x, (12)
µˆ = Λˆ−1(λnx¯y). (13)
The predicted values from the model are yˆ = xT µˆ.
The DP sufficient statistics are given by nxˆx = nx¯x +
ηxx, nxˆy = nx¯y + ηxy, where ηxx, ηxy consist of suitably
scaled Gaussian noise added independently to each dimen-
sion. In total, there are d(d + 1)/2 + d parameters in the
combined sufficient statistic, since nx¯x is a symmetric ma-
trix.
The main idea in the data projection is simply to project
the data into some reduced range. Since the noise level
is determined by the sensitivity of the data, reducing the
sensitivity by limiting the data range translates into less
added noise.
With projection threshold c, the projection of data xi is
given by
x˘i = max(−c,min(xi, c)). (14)
This data projection obviously discards information, but in
various problems it can be beneficial to disregard some in-
formation in the data in order to achieve less noisy estimates
of the model parameters. From the bias-variance trade-off
point of view, this can be seen as increasing the bias while
reducing the variance. The optimal trade-off then depends
on the actual problem.
To run Algorithm 2 (in the main text), we need to as-
sume projection bounds (cj , dj) for each dimension j ∈
{1, . . . , d+ 1} for the data (xi, yi)ni=1. In the paper we as-
sume bounds of the form (−cj , cj). To find good projection
bounds, we first find an optimal projection threshold by a
grid search on an auxiliary dataset, that is generated from a
BLR model similar to the regression model defined above.
This gives us the projection thresholds in terms of std for
each dimension. We then estimate the marginal std for each
dimension by using Algorithm 1 (in the main text), to fix the
actual projection thresholds. For this the data is assumed
to lie on some known bounded interval. In practice, the
assumed bounds need to be based on prior information. In
case the estimates are negative due to noise, they are set to
small positive constants (0.5 in all the tests).
The amount of noise each client needs to add to the output
depends partly on the sensitivity of the function in question.
The query function we are interested in returns a vector of
length d(d+ 1)/2 + d that contains all the unique terms in
the sufficient statistics needed for linear regression.
Let x,y be the mismatching, maximally different elements
over adjacent datasets s.t. dimensions 1, . . . , d are the in-
dependent variables, and d + 1 is the target. Assume fur-
ther that each dimension j = 1, . . . , d + 1 is bounded by
(−cj , cj). The squared sensitivity of the query f is then
∆2(f)
2 = ||f(x)− f(y)||22 (15)
= ||(xjxk − yjyk, xjxd+1 − yjyd+1)dj=1,k=j ||22
(16)
=
d∑
j=1
d∑
k=j
(xjxk − yjyk)2 +
d∑
j=1
(xjxd+1 − yjyd+1)2
(17)
≤
d∑
j=1
(c2j )
2 +
d∑
j=1
d∑
k>j
(2cjck)
2 +
d∑
j=1
(2cjcd+1)
2.
(18)
We assume cj = cx∀j = 1, . . . , d, so (18) can be further
simplified to d(2d− 1)c4x + 4d(cxcd+1)2.
11 GDSC dataset description
The data were downloaded from the Genomics of Drug Sen-
sitivity in Cancer (GDSC) project, release 6.1, March 2017,
http://www.cancerrxgene.org/. We use gene expression and
drug sensitivity data. The gene expression dimensionality
is reduced to 10 genes used for the actual prediction task,
based on prior information about their mutation counts in
cancer (we use the same procedure as [17]). The dataset
used for learning contains 940 cell lines and drug sensitivity
data for 265 drugs. Some of the values are missing, so the
actual number of observations varies between the drugs. We
use a test set of size 100 and the rest of the available data
for learning.
Since we want to focus on the relative expression of the
genes, each data point is normalized to have l2-norm of 1.
In the distributed setting this can be done by each client
without breaching privacy. After the scaling, we also know
that the sensitivity of each dimension is at most 1. For
the target value, we assume a range of [-7.5,7.5] for the
marginal standard deviation estimation. The true range
varies between drugs, with the length of all the ranges less
than 12. In other words, the estimate used adds some amount
of extra noise to the results.
12 Asymptotic efficiency of the Gaussian
mechanism
The asymptotic efficiency of the sufficient statistics pertur-
bation using Laplace mechanism has been proven before
[14, 17]. We show corresponding results for the Gaussian
mechanism. The proofs generally follow closely those given
in [17]. For convenience, we state the relevant definitions,
but mostly focus on those proofs that differ in a non-trivial
way from the existing ones for the Laplace mechanism. For
the full proofs and related discussion, see [17].
12.1 Definition of asymptotic efficiency
Definition 12.1. A differentially private mechanism M
is asymptotically consistent with respect to an estimated
parameter θ if the private estimates θˆM given a data set
D converge in probability to the corresponding non-private
estimates θˆNP as the number of samples, n = |D|, grows
without bound, i.e., if for any3 α > 0,
lim
n→∞Pr{‖θˆM − θˆNP ‖ > α} = 0.
Definition 12.2. A differentially private mechanismM is
asymptotically efficiently private with respect to an esti-
mated parameter θ, if the mechanism is asymptotically
consistent and the private estimates θˆM converge to the cor-
responding non-private estimates θˆNP at the rate O(1/n),
i.e., if for any α > 0 there exist constants C,N such that
Pr{‖θˆM − θˆNP ‖ > C/n} < α
for all n ≥ N .
The first part of Theorem 3 follows closely the correspond-
ing result for the Laplace mechanism [17, Theorem 1]. The
theorem shows that the optimal rate for estimating the expec-
tation of exponential family distributions is O(1/n). This
justifies the term asymptotically efficiently private intro-
duced by [17], when we show that sufficient statistics per-
turbation by the Gaussian mechanism achieves this rate.
Theorem 3. The private estimates θˆM of an exponential
family posterior expectation parameter θ, generated by a
differentially private mechanism M that achieves (, δ)-
differential privacy for any  > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), cannot con-
verge to the corresponding non-private estimates θˆNP at
a rate faster than 1/n. That is, assuming M is (, δ)-
differentially private, there exists no function f(n) such
that lim supnf(n) = 0 and for all α > 0, there exists a
constant N such that
Pr{‖θˆM − θˆNP ‖ > f(n)} < α
for all n ≥ N .
Proof. The non-private estimate of an expectation parame-
ter of an exponential family is [7]
θˆNP |x1, . . . , xn = n0x0 +
∑n
i=1 xi
n0 + n
. (19)
The difference of the estimates from two neighbouring data
sets differing by one element is
(θˆNP |D)− (θˆNP |D′) = x− y
n0 + n
, (20)
3We use α in limit expressions instead of usual  to avoid
confusion with -differential privacy.
where x and y are the corresponding mismatched elements.
Let ∆ = max(‖x− y‖), and let D and D′ be neighbouring
data sets including these maximally different elements.
Let us assume that there exists a function f(n) such that
lim supnf(n) = 0 and for all α > 0 there exists a constant
N such that
Pr{‖θˆM − θˆNP ‖ > f(n)} < α
for all n ≥ N .
Fix α > 0 and choose M ≥ max(N,n0) such that
f(n) ≤ ∆/4n
for all n ≥M . This implies that
‖(θˆNP |D)−(θˆNP |D′)‖ = ∆
n0 + n
≥ ∆
2n
≥ 2f(n). (21)
Let us define the region
CD = {t | ‖(θˆNP |D)− t‖ < f(n)}.
Based on our assumptions we have
Pr(θˆM|D ∈ CD) >1− α (22)
Pr(θˆM|D′ ∈ CD) <α (23)
Pr(θˆM|D ∈ CD) ≤ exp()Pr(θˆM|D′ ∈ CD) + δ (24)
which implies that
1− α < exp()α+ δ (25)
⇔ δ >1− (1 + exp())α. (26)
Since for fixed , limα→0 1−(1+exp())α = 1,M cannot
be (, δ)-differentially private with any  and δ < 1.
Before the next theorem, we prove Lemma 1, which is not
used in [17].
Lemma 1. Let x ∈ Rd, x ∼ N(0, σ2I). The tail probabil-
ity of the `1 norm of x obeys
Pr(‖x‖1 ≥ t) ≤ dσ
2(
t−√2/pidσ)2
(
1− 2
pi
)
. (27)
Proof. ‖x‖1 =
∑d
i=1 |xi| =
∑d
i=1 yi, where xi ∼
N(0, σ2) and yi follows the half-normal distribution with
variance σ2.
It is known that E[yi] =
√
2/piσ and Var[yi] = σ2(1 −
2/pi).
Because yi are independent, E[‖x‖1] = dE[yi] =√
2/pidσ and Var[‖x‖1] = dVar[yi] = dσ2(1− 2/pi).
Setting a = t−√2/pidσ we have
Pr(‖x‖1 ≥ t) = Pr
(
‖x‖1 ≥ a+
√
2/pidσ
)
≤ Pr
(∣∣∣‖x‖1 −√2/pidσ∣∣∣ ≥ a)
≤ dσ
2(
t−√2/pidσ)2
(
1− 2
pi
)
.
where the last inequality follows from Chebyshev’s inequal-
ity.
12.1.1 Asymptotic efficiency of Gaussian means
Theorem 4, showing one case of asymptotic efficiency of
the Gaussian mechanism, corresponds to [17, Theorem 5],
although the proof is somewhat different.
Theorem 4. (, δ)-differentially private estimate of the
mean of a d-dimensional Gaussian variable x bounded by
‖xi‖1 ≤ B in which the Gaussian mechanism is used to
perturb the sufficient statistics, is asymptotically efficiently
private.
Proof. Following [17, Theorem 3], it is trivial to show that
‖µDP − µNP ‖1 ≤ c
n
‖δ‖1,
where δ = (δ1, . . . , δd)T ∈ RD with δj ∼ N
(
0, σ2j
)
holds
when we utilize the Gaussian mechanism instead of the
Laplace mechanism. This allows us to bound the corre-
sponding tail probabilities by using Lemma 1.
Therefore, given α > 0, we can guarantee that
Pr
{
‖µDP − µNP ‖1 > C
n
}
≤Pr
{
1
n
‖δ‖1 > C
n
}
(28)
=Pr{‖δ‖1 > C} < α,
(29)
by choosing C according to Lemma 1.
12.2 Asymptotic efficiency of DP linear regression
Theorem 5 that establishes asymptotic efficiency for DP
linear regression using the Gaussian mechanism, for the
most part follows [17, Theorem 8]. We concentrate here
more closely only on the differing parts.
Theorem 5. (, δ)-differentially private inference of the
posterior mean of the weights of linear regression with the
Gaussian mechanism used to perturb the sufficient statistics
is asymptotically efficiently private.
Proof. Following the proof of [17, Theorem 7] with mini-
mal changes we have
‖µDP − µNP ‖1 ≤
∥∥(Λ0 + Λ(nx¯x+ ∆))−1Λδ∥∥1
+
∥∥∥∥∥
[(
1
n
Λ0 + Λ
(
x¯x+
1
n
∆
))−1
−
(
1
n
Λ0 + Λx¯x
)−1]
×
(
Λx¯y +
1
n
Λ0β0
)∥∥∥∥∥
1
(30)
where ∆ is the noise contribution from the Gaussian mecha-
nism added to the sufficient statistics x¯x (see Section 10 in
this supplement).
As in [17, Theorem 7], the first term can be bounded as
∥∥(Λ0 + Λ(nx¯x+ ∆))−1Λδ∥∥1 ≤ c1n ∥∥(x¯x)−1∥∥1 ‖δ‖1
(31)
where c1 > 1, for large enough n.
As done in the proof of Theorem 4, given α > 0, Lemma 1
can be used to ensure that
Pr
{
‖(Λ0 + Λ(nx¯x+ ∆))−1Λδ‖1 > C1
n
}
<
α
2
, (32)
by choosing a suitable C1.
Again, following [17, Theorem 7], the second term can be
bounded as
∥∥∥∥∥
[(
1
n
Λ0 + Λ
(
x¯x+
1
n
∆
))−1
−
(
1
n
Λ0 + Λx¯x
)−1]
×
(
Λx¯y +
1
n
Λ0β0
)∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ c2
n
∥∥∥(x¯x)−1∥∥∥
1
‖∆‖1
∥∥∥(x¯x)−1∥∥∥
1
‖x¯y‖1 ,
where, as in Eq. (31), the bound is valid for c2 > 1 as n gets
large enough.
‖∆‖1 here is the l1-norm of the symmetric matrix ∆, that
is comprised of a vector of d(d+ 1)/2 unique noise terms,
each generated independently from a Normal distribution
according to the Gaussian mechanism. Denoting this vector
by v, a bound to the matrix norm is given by ‖∆‖1 ≤ ‖v‖1.
Therefore, given α > 0, we can again use Lemma 1 to find
a suitable C2 s.t.
Pr
‖∆‖1 > C2c2 ∥∥∥(x¯x)−1∥∥∥2
1
‖x¯y‖1

≤ Pr
‖v‖1 > C2c2 ∥∥∥(x¯x)−1∥∥∥2
1
‖x¯y‖1
 < α2 . (33)
By combining Eqs. (32) and (33) we get
Pr
{
‖µDP − µNP ‖1 >
C1 + C2
n
}
< α. (34)
